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‘There is wide recognition that we have so far been unable to stop and reverse environmental 
degradation and that the current environmental system is fragmented, duplicitous and lacks 
coherence, thereby reducing its capacity and efficiency.’1 
  
                 
                                    Chapter One: Introduction  
 
Environmental law is at the forefront of the global community and environmental protection 
and conservation is regarded as of utmost importance. In order to ensure the effective 
development and conservation of the environment, measures of control and governance must 
be implemented. Significant natural resources, from the ocean bed to the atmosphere, are 
shared regionally or globally. Yet, despite the multitude of treaties, conventions, and 
agencies, the current global environmental management system has failed to address and 
solve problems related to global environmental degradation.2    
Global environmental protection is on the agenda of most countries. Concerted effort has 
been made in order to combat the scourge of environmental degradation on a local as well as 
international level. Environmental degradation is the deterioration of the environment 
through the depletion of resources such as air, water and soil. It also involves the destruction 
of ecosystems and the extinction of wildlife. It is defined as any change or disturbance to the 
environment perceived to be deleterious or undesirable.3 It is caused by the combination of an 
already very large and increasing human population, continually increasing economic growth 
or per capita affluence, and the application of resource depleting and polluting technology.4 
Indeed if environmental degradation continues to occur at this already rapid rate, there will 
soon be no resources left to utilise on earth and this will then impact society as a whole in 
relation to food and growth. Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan once held 
that we fundamentally depend on natural systems and resources for our existence and 
                                                          
1
 Berruga E. & Maurer P., (2007), The informal consultative process on the institutional framework for the UN’s 
environmental activities – Co-Chairs summary. In: Swart, L. and Perry, E. (Eds), Global Environmental 
Governance – Perspectives on the Current Debate, 16, at 25 (New York: Center for UN Reform Education). 
2
 Etsy D. & Ivanova M., (2001), Making International Environmental Efforts Work: The Case for a Global 
Environmental Organisation, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, page 1. 
3
 Huesemann M.H., (2011), Sustainability or Collapse? in Technofix: Why Technology Won’t Save Us or the 
Environment,  New Society Publishers. 
4
 Ibid. 
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development. ‘Our efforts to defeat poverty and pursue sustainable development will be in 
vain if environmental degradation and natural resource depletion continue unabated.’5 
In order to address the challenge of global environmental degradation and natural resource 
depletion, a complex and multi-layered environmental governance structure has materialised 
over the past few decades.6 There is widespread agreement that the current international 
environmental regime is too complex and inadequate to effectively address global 
environmental challenges. Thus, in order to control the threat of environmental degradation, 
many countries, authors, commentators and academics alike have opined that one centralised 
body be created for the effective control and governance of environmental matters on an 
international level. Governance is not the same as government. It includes the actions of the 
state and, in addition, encompasses actors such as communities, businesses, and Non-
Governmental Organisations (hereafter referred to as NGOs).7 Within the context of the 
evolution of global environmental politics and policy, the end goal of global environmental 
governance is to improve the state of the environment and to eventually lead to the broader 
goal of sustainable development.8 The efficacy of global environmental governance will 
ultimately depend on implementation at global and domestic levels. National implementation 
is the ultimate key, both to the efficacy of the GEG system and to meaningful environmental 
improvements.9  
 
In the following composition, I will critically analyse the concept of a Global Environmental 
Organisation (hereafter referred to as a GEO) and discuss whether the formation of such an 
establishment is indeed necessary to handle environmental matters on an international scale. 
A GEO is seen as the necessary centralised institutional body required to effectively govern 
issues relating to the environment. We understand global environmental governance as the 
sum of organizations, policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, procedures and norms 
                                                          
5
 Perrez F. & Ziegerer D., (2008), A Non-institutional Proposal to Strengthen International Environmental 
Governance, Environmental Policy and Law 38/5, page 253. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Huesemann M.H., (2011), Sustainability or Collapse? in Technofix: Why Technology Won’t Save Us or the 
Environment,  New Society Publishers. 
8
 Najam A. Papa M. & Taiyab N., (2006), Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, (Winnipeg, Canada), page 9. 
9
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 298 – 299. 
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that regulate the processes of global environmental protection.10 The establishment of a GEO 
can have a major impact in controlling the spread of environmental degradation as 
environmental actors from all over the world can try and work together to control the current 
surge of degradation affecting society today. Environmental governance is synonymous with 
interventions aiming at changes in environment-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, 
decision making, and behaviours. More specifically, the term environmental governance is 
used to refer to the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which 
political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes.11  
Before exploring whether a GEO is the required tool to ensure effective global environmental 
protection, I will expand upon factors that relate to global environmental governance. In 
doing so, this composition aims to ensure that the different forms of environmental 
governance that currently exist are highlighted and discussed. Since a GEO will deal with the 
governing of all environmental matters on an international scale, it is of pertinent importance 
to understand the various forms of international governance. Chapter Two of this 
composition will deal with global environmental governance, and will serve to expand ones 
knowledge on the various instruments used in global governance. Emphasis will indeed be 
placed upon global environmental governance, as well as other forms of environmental 
governance including decentralised environmental governance, cross-scale environmental 
governance, market and agent-focused instruments, global environmental law and 
transnational environmental law. These factors are of utmost importance when dealing with 
governance as a whole, so it is indeed necessary to explore which mechanisms can be used 
for effective global environmental governance.  
Since proposals have been brought forward for the creation of a GEO, it is important to know 
why these proposals have come into existence and also what the problems with the previous 
systems are. Thus, the previous systems must be looked at in order for us to understand why 
the establishment of a new centralised GEO has been called for. In Chapter Three of this 
composition, I will critically analyse the shortcomings of the current system which has led to 
the proposal of a GEO. There are various factors which have led to the degradation of global 
environmental governance itself. These factors have caused the current system to be fairly 
ineffective in nature and as a result, a gaping hole has been formed in the field of effective 
                                                          
10
 Najam A. Papa M. & Taiyab N., (2006), Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, (Winnipeg, Canada), page 3.  
11
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 298 – 299. 
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global environmental management and governance. Factors such as fragmentation and 
dilution of international law will be looked at. I will also highlight the imbalance that exists 
between the environmental regime and other regimes as well as the lack of institutional 
leadership, political will and commitment that is apparent today. These shortcomings have 
played a major role in environmental degradation because there has been no cohesion on the 
part of environmental actors when dealing with problems facing the environment. 
The fourth chapter of this composition will deal with the models that have been proposed for 
the creation of a specialised GEO. This chapter will explore recommendations made for the 
various models of environmental governance. The compliance model, the organisational 
streamlining model, the multiple actors model, upgrading the United Nations Environment 
Programme model and the new agency model will each be explored. Indeed one of these 
models should be used when deciding whether to create a GEO which will lead to better 
global environmental governance. This chapter serves the purpose of developing the readers 
knowledge in relation to the various ways in which a new system can be created for effective 
environmental management and implementation. I will evaluate which model would be best 
for the creation of a new GEO. 
Chapter Five of this composition will contain my concluding remarks as well as 
recommendations for the creation of a GEO. After developing an understanding of effective 
global environmental governance and the mechanisms that can be used to achieve this, it is 
important to note what the best way forward will be. This chapter will provide some insights 
in order to ensure that the global community takes a step in the right direction in terms of 
effective global environmental governance. Ultimately, environmental degradation can only 
be effectively managed if all matters relating to environmental conservation and protection 
are effectively managed by the global community as a whole.     
Thus, it is of pertinent importance to explore whether the mechanism of a GEO is indeed the 
solution to ultimately controlling and reducing the surge of environmental degradation that 
we as a global society are currently faced with. 
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Chapter Two: Global Environmental Governance  
 
The following chapter will deal with certain aspects involved in global environmental 
governance. This chapter aims to ensure that the reader understands all the mechanics that are 
involved in global environmental law and governance as a whole. Indeed if a GEO is to be 
established, it must be able to govern all aspects of international environmental law. 
Governance is therefore central to the efficient and effective combating of environmental 
degradation. The core themes of global environmental governance that will be highlighted 
include decentralised environmental governance, market and individual-focused instruments, 
and governance across scales.  
Decentralised environmental governance refers to the devolution of state powers or assets to 
local decision-making bodies, including non-state associations.12 It is especially intricate 
because it is not only about providing services efficiently, but it also requires the devolution 
of real powers over the disposition of productive resources and it requires the resolution of 
divergent interests among a host of actors.13   
Market and individual-focused instruments aims to mobilise individual incentives in favour 
of environmentally positive outcomes through a careful calculation and modulation of costs 
and benefits associated with particular environmental strategies.  
Governance across scales is understood more as linkages between various levels of governing 
bodies, local, national, and global, that is used to further their own interests.14 
These are among the most important emerging trends that are shaping environmental 
governance. They are generating pressures for innovative ways to address environmental and 
natural resource crises and challenging existing forms of governance.15  
 
Global environmental governance describes an interconnected world across environments, 
societies, and economies. Multiplicity, diversity, interdependence, and flows of influence and 
                                                          
12
 Ribot J.C., (1999), Decentralisation, participation and accountability in Sahelian forestry: legal instruments of 
political-administrative control Africa, 69 (1), page 23. 
13
 Agrawal A. and Ribot J., (1999), Accountability in decentralization: a framework with South Asian and West 
African cases, The Journal of Developing Areas, 33, Page 474. 
14
 Adger W., Brown K. and Tompkins E.L., (2005), The Political Economy of Cross-scale Networks in E-source 
Co-management, Ecology and Society, page 9. 
15
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 299. 
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materials are common themes associated with global governance.16 From an environmental 
perspective, global governance produces both negative and positive pressures on governance. 
Economic globalisation produces tremendous impacts on environmental processes at the 
local, regional, national, and global levels by integrating far-flung markets and increasing 
demand. Global governance may intensify the use and depletion of natural resources, increase 
waste production, and lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ as capital moves globally to countries 
and locations that have less stringent environmental standards.17 Observers of global 
governance also argue in favour of its potentially positive impacts on economic equity and 
environmental standards through a virtuous circle and the diffusion of positive environmental 
policy initiatives. Clearly, the globalisation of environmental problems has contributed to the 
creation and development of new global regimes, institutions, and organizations dedicated to 
environmental governance.18  
 
 
2.1. Decentralised Environmental Governance 
 
 
Decentralisation is defined as the devolution of state powers or assets to local decision-
making bodies, including non-state associations.19 Decentralisation of natural resource 
management is especially intricate because it is not only about providing services efficiently, 
but it also requires the devolution of real powers over the disposition of productive resources. 
In addition, it requires the resolution of divergent interests among a host of actors so that 
externalities are not disproportionately borne by any subgroup.20  
 
In terms of decentralised environmental governance many nation states no longer have the 
resources to manage their environments.21 At the same time, as emerging economic forces 
have challenged the political and economic capacities of nation states, a shift toward more 
                                                          
16
 Anderson D. & Grove R., ed. (1984), Conservation in Africa: People, Policies and Practice, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 301. 
19
 Ribot J.C., (1999), Decentralisation, participation and accountability in Sahelian forestry: legal instruments of 
political-administrative control Africa, 69 (1), page 23. 
20
 Agrawal A. and Ribot J., (1999), Accountability in decentralization: a framework with South Asian and West 
African cases, The Journal of Developing Areas, 33, Page 474. 
21
 Wunsch JS, & Olowu D., (1997), Regime transformation from below: decentralization, local governance, and 
democratic reform in Nigeria, Stud. Comp. Int. Dev, 31: 66 – 82. 
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democratic political processes throughout much of the developing world has facilitated the 
move toward alternative forms of governance whose effectiveness depends on higher levels 
of participation and greater involvement of citizens in processes of governance.22 
Decentralisation disperses multiple points of political leverage throughout an administrative 
structure and makes them available to central decision makers. It does so by encouraging the 
systematic creation of legal codes and performance standards that are specified through the 
exercise of legislative or executive authority. Adherence to these codes and standards is the 
price of inclusion in decision-making processes.23  
 
The primary arguments in favour of decentralisation are that decentralisation produces more 
just and equitable outcomes and that localised control is more functional than state control.24 
Put simply, consultation and collaboration with social movements and voluntary associations 
provides an effective means of harnessing local knowledge and agency in both plan making 
and implementation.25 Engaged civic actors can also act as a check on state power, thus 
helping to democratize governance and offer a counterpoint to its limited, rationalist 
worldview.26 An analysis of the failures of modernist planning, the absence of an effective 
civil society is a crucial factor in rendering centralized authority insensitive to local 
conditions and producing devastatingly undemocratic outcomes.27 Indeed the role of civil 
society as a mediating structure between individual's private life and the large institutions of 
public life must be considered. The concept of decentralization in its various forms has been 
around a long time. However it is the systematic effort to translate it into specific public 
policies that is new.28 
 
The trend toward decentralization and enhancing the role of civil society is now discernable 
in many aspects of natural resource policy around the world, including, forest management, 
                                                          
22
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 303. 
23
 Ibid at 305. 
24
 Agrawal A., (2000), Small is beautifull, but is larger better? Forest Management Institutions in the Kumaon 
Himalaya, India in C.C. Gibson, M.A. McKean, E. Ostrom (Eds.), People and Forests; Communities, 
Institutions, and Governance, The MIT Press, London, page 57. 
25
 Weber E., (1998), Pluralism by the Rules: Conflict and Cooperation in Environmental Regulation, 
Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, page 733. 
26
 Eberley D.E., (2000), The meaning, origins, and applications of civil society, The Essential Civil Society 
Reader: The Classic Essays, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, page 3. 
27
 Scott J.C., (2001), Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 
28
 Berger P.L. and Neuhaus R.J., (2000), To empower people: from state to civil society in D.E. Eberly (Ed.), 
The Essential Civil Society Reader: The Classic Essays, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham (2000), page 144. 
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conservation, watershed management, and regional planning as well as a host of other areas 
of social policy.29 Few voices have been heard to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy of 
decentralization in various areas. Some have shown how the operation of power relations at 
the local level can operate to exclude some interests, thereby undermining the democratic 
claims of the optimists.30 Observers of decentralization in the context of developing countries 
have suggested that decentralization can enhance the dominance of elites, deepen 
authoritarian governance, and even increase intolerance toward minorities.31 This is because 
knowledge and management in these specific areas are not as refined. Thus, those in control 
can take advantage of the various resources available in these developing nations and prevent 
those who are not in control from gaining an equitable share from the development and 
growth. There is also room for cynicism that decentralization policies have typically been 
motivated by powerful state actors to enhance their own political positions. Without effective 
safeguards against arbitrary exercise of localized power and clear relations of accountability, 
decentralization may lead to forms of regulation even more suffocating than those 
encouraged by more centralised control. The contingent outcomes of contemporary shifts in 
governance, therefore, depend crucially on the ways local actors mobilize and establish 
alliances across socio-political and administrative scales of governance.32 Some critics in the 
rush to decentralize governance have emphasized the importance of the state as a mediating 
force and its potential for fashioning effective policy in democratic ways.33 
 
 
2.2. Market and Agent-Focused Instruments 
 
 
In terms of Market and agent-focused instruments (hereafter referred to as MAFIs), instead of 
relying on hierarchically organized, regulatory control or even purely participatory structures, 
                                                          
29
 Agrawal A., (2000), Small is beautiful, but is larger better? Forest Management Institutions in the Kumaon 
Himalaya, India in C.C. Gibson, M.A. McKean, E. Ostrom (Eds.), People and Forests; Communities, 
Institutions, and Governance, The MIT Press, London, page 57. 
30
 Leach M., Mearns R. and Scoones I., (1999), Environmental entitlements: dynamics and institutions in 
community-based natural resource management World Development, 27 (2), page 225. 
31
 Ribot J.C., (2002), Democratic Decentralization of Natural Resources: Institutionalizing Popular 
Participation, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. 
32
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 305. 
33
 Hutchcroft P.D., (2001), Centralization and decentralization in administration and politics: assessing 
territorial dimensions of power and authority, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and 
Administration, 14 (1) (2001), page 23 – 24.  
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MAFIs aim to mobilize individual incentives in favour of environmentally positive outcomes 
through a careful calculation and modulation of costs and benefits associated with particular 
environmental strategies.34 MAFIs encompass a broad range, namely, eco-taxes and subsidies 
based on a mix of regulation and market incentives, voluntary agreements, certification, eco-
labelling, and informational systems are some of the major examples. MAFIs differ from 
more conventional regulatory mechanisms along a number of dimensions, including the 
source of their legitimacy and authority. It is suggested that the strength of these instruments 
lies in their utilisation of market exchanges and incentives to encourage environmental 
compliance.35 
 
At the national level, the popularity of these instruments and frameworks has increased 
quickly, even if their adoption and implementation can be differentiated by sector and 
geography rather than being uniform. Their popularity seems to relate to a general 
dissatisfaction with old policy instruments, the influence, transfer, and diffusion of emerging 
governance paradigms based in neoliberal institutionalism and free trade agreements; and the 
need for market innovations that keep national economies competitive in a globalizing 
world.36 Voluntary agreements are negotiated to meet environmental targets such as lower 
emissions and waste reduction.37 
 
Some of the drivers of market-based policy instruments in the developed world are analogous 
to those motivating decentralized environmental governance in much of the developing 
world.38 Dissatisfaction with regulatory control by state agencies and the bureaucratization 
associated with their growth play an important role in the expansion of market incentives-
based instruments and in their adoption across sectors and national boundaries.39 Difficulties 
in implementation of traditional regulatory instruments provide a partial explanation of the 
willingness of governments to experiment with market-oriented efforts. High costs of 
                                                          
34
 Lafferty W. & Meadowcroft J., eds. (2000), Implementing Sustainable Development, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
35
 Cashore B., (2002), Legitimacy and the privatization of environmental governance: How non-state market 
driven (NSMD) governance systems gain rule-making authority. Governance 15, page 503. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 307. 
38
 Engel S., Lopez R. and Palmer C., (2006), Community-industry contracting over natural resource use in a 
context of weak property rights: the case of Indonesia, Environmental and Resource Economics, page 73. 
39
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 305 - 306. 
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compliance with environmental regulations and increasing awareness of environmental issues 
among consumers are other parts of the explanation.  
 
The success of MAFIs depends significantly on the internalization of positive environment 
preferences among relevant stakeholders, most importantly citizens and consumers and 
effective leadership by governments.40 Among the constraints to the implementation of 
MAFIs is the opposition of environmental policy actors (especially environmental 
movements) and other vested interests (such as energy-intensive industries).41 Other 
constraints to successful implementation are lack of expertise across policy systems, fear 
among corporate sectors about loss of economic competitiveness, and unequal distributional 
impacts because of eco-taxing schemes (e.g., fuel taxes). Not surprisingly, corporate and 
industry actors are less likely to adhere voluntarily to new environmental standards to the 
extent that they prove more costly in comparison to when such standards are absent or 
weak.42 Indeed, efforts to induce voluntary compliance by economically motivated actors 
have been found to be vulnerable to free-riding behaviour when effective mechanisms to 
deter free riding are not in place.43 
 
Citizen preferences expressed in the form of a greater willingness to purchase green products 
and policy environments in which superior environmental outcomes are prized are important 
drivers of the success of new MAFIs of environmental governance. These considerations 
suggest that the growing popularity of market incentives-based instruments should not lead to 
the conclusion that governance is replacing governments. A conclusion more broadly 
supported by existing evidence would be that there is a complex relationship between 
governments and governance where governments are the source of credible threats of 
regulatory action that would require costly compliance and such threats encourage the 
adoption of voluntary agreements on environmental standards. Government agencies also 
remain the monitoring authorities to which appeals regarding violations of environmental 
standards can be made.44 
                                                          
40
 Brammer S. and Millington A., (2003), The effect of stakeholder preferences, organizational structure and 
industry type on corporate community involvement, Journal of Business Ethics, page 213. 
41
 Jordan A., Wurtzel R. and Zito A.R., (2003), “New” environmental policy instruments: an evolution or a 
revolution in environmental policy? Environmental Politics, page 201. 
42
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 307. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 308. 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
2.3. Cross-Scale Environmental Governance 
 
 
In environmental governance research, the concept of cross-scale governance is understood 
more as linkages between various levels of governing bodies, local, national, and global, that 
is used to further their own interests. Institutional interplay at different levels can be highly 
asymmetric or relatively balanced.45 
 
In terms of cross-scale environmental governance, cross-scale environmental problems affect 
and are affected by institutionalized decision making at local, sub-national, national, and 
transnational levels. A common prescription to address the multilevel character of 
environmental problems is to design governance mechanisms across levels of social and 
institutional aggregation.46 Multilevel governance is intended to counteract the fragmentation 
that is characteristic of sector-based decision making or, indeed, of decision making that is 
organized by territorial, social, and political divisions. The involvement of public-private 
networks in multilevel governance can enhance the representation of the diversity of interests 
that are affected by environmental problems. Cross-scale networks of resource management 
cannot only create more resilient governance but also governance that is more participatory 
and effective. Resilience and stability of governance systems depends on the distribution of 
benefits from cross-scale linkages, demonstrated by the ability of the system to command 
legitimacy and trust among the resource user and governmental stakeholders.47  
 
Multilevel cross-scale governance should be promoted not just for ecological reasons, but 
because shared responsibility for management of resources creates positive incentives for 
sustainable use. It also overcomes problems of legitimacy from traditional natural resource 
management and its presumption that the local regime should avoid a larger, scalar 
                                                          
45
 Adger W., Brown K. and Tompkins E.L., (2005), The Political Economy of Cross-scale Networks in E-source 
Co-management, Ecology and Society, page 9. 
46
 Adger N. Brown K. & Tompkins EL., (2006), The Political Economy of Cross-Scale Networks in Resource 
Co-Management, Ecol. Soc. 10:18. 
47
 Markelova H. and Mwangi E., (2012), Multilevel Governance and Cross-Scale Coordination for Natural 
Resource Management: Lessons from Current Research, in The Wealth of the Commons, Bollier D. and 
Helfrich S., editors, The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond Market and State, Levellers Press, available 
at http://wealthofthecommons.org/essay/multilevel-governance-and-cross-scale-coordination-natural-resource-
management-lessons-current (last accessed 10/5/14). 
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interdependence.48 There must be procedures in both policy-making and implementation that 
encourages public participation, democratic control and community participation which will 
then allow for governance arrangements that spans across various levels which in turn allows 
for effective cross-scale governance in terms of environmental law.49 
 
Cross-scale environmental governance mechanisms are being shaped by non-state actors 
including Non-Governmental Organisations (hereafter referred to as NGOs), transnational 
environmental organizations, intergovernmental and multilateral organizations, market-
oriented actors (transnational and multinational companies), and epistemic communities. 
These new actors both introduce innovative tools and mechanisms and positively shape 
power relations within the policy arena, even if their transformative potential is contested.50 It 
is indeed critical to pay attention to multi-locale bridging arrangements and linkages between 
villages and non-local or non-governmental actors (NGOs). The bridging relationships with 
external actors have their own impact on local capacity to respond to changes and pressures. 
These abilities have often resulted in interesting re-negotiations of the relationships between 
villager, village government, state and business.51 
 
Cross-scale environmental governance can indeed allow for community participation in 
natural resource management and governance. This has been promoted widely for the past 
few decades as a bottom-up way of creating cross-scale governance linkages. By giving 
people a stake in the process, community participation enhances the prospects of efficient, 
equitable and sustainable joint action, especially for communities that have an integrated 
social structure and common interests.52 However, these initiatives require support from 
external agencies in order for them to function effectively. This could in turn cause further 
problems and set-backs for effective cross-scale environmental governance to actually take 
place. The fact that various actors (including governmental and non-governmental actors) 
                                                          
48
 Adger W., Brown K. and Tompkins E.L., (2005), The Political Economy of Cross-scale Networks in E-source 
Co-management, Ecology and Society, page 9. 
49
 Ribot J., Agrawal A. and Larson A., (2006), Recentralizing While Decentralizing: How National 
Governments Re-appropriate Forest Resources, World Development, page 1864.  
50
 Lemos M. & Agarwal A., (2006), Environmental Governance, School of Natural Resources and Environment, 
(University of Michigan), page 309. 
51
 Bebbington A., Dharmawan L., Fahmi E. and Guggenheim S., (2006), Local Capacity, Village Governance 
and the Political Economy of Rural Development in Indonesia, World Development, page 1958. 
52
 Markelova H. and Mwangi E., (2012), Multilevel Governance and Cross-Scale Coordination for Natural 
Resource Management: Lessons from Current Research, in The Wealth of the Commons, Bollier D. and 
Helfrich S., editors, The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond Market and State, Levellers Press, available 
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must play a role for the effective functioning of cross-scale environmental governance can 
also be seen as a hindrance to its initial purpose and design as many problems can arise. 
Cross-scale environmental governance can be better served if a centralised point of operation 
is created for the effective functioning and governance of environmental law. Even though 
the idea of cross-scale environmental governance is very relevant, its effective 
implementation requires more than what currently stands today. 
 
 
2.4. Global Environmental Law 
 
In the environmental arena, international cooperation is often necessary to coordinate national 
activities and spur international action to resolve global problems that no nation can handle 
on its own.53 The notion of ‘strength in numbers’ seems to be prevalent when it comes to 
global environmental law. Governments could also empower the new agency to coordinate 
multilateral environmental agreements (generally by a decision of the respective conferences 
of the parties). The constitutive treaty of a new agency or organization could provide general 
principles for multilateral environmental treaties as well as coordinating rules that govern the 
organization and its relationship with the issue-specific environmental regimes.54 
States have created international institutions and organisations to serve as facilitators of 
collective action in the management of the global commons and trans-boundary pollution. 
Furthermore, common problems that occur around the world may be conformed to common 
solutions, which makes an international response useful, and in some instances very 
necessary. International organizations have proved valuable for dealing with such issues by 
channelling information, training, and financial resources to the affected countries.55  
Global environmental law also serves as a convener for articulating and aggregating the 
interests of multiple stakeholders, encouraging a broader social dialogue. However, practical 
coordination is politically difficult, as states are often unwilling to bear the sizable cost of 
environmental protection, and regional and global environmental problems overlie many 
traditional policy antipathies. For example, while industrialized countries have been mostly 
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concerned with commons and trans-boundary issues, developing countries are more 
interested in local issues such as desertification and resource use.56 
Agreements or treaties that arise as a result of ‘Global Environmental Law’ could be divided 
into ‘multilateral’57 and ‘pluri-lateral’58 environmental agreements. For ‘multilateral’ 
agreements, ratification would be compulsory for any new member of the organization (if it 
were to be established), while ‘pluri-lateral’ agreements would still leave members the option 
to remain outside. The multilateral agreements would thus form the ‘global environmental 
law code’ which can then serve as an international basis for the protection and conservation 
of the environment. 
This would further allow for the development of a common reporting system for all 
multilateral environmental agreements, which then allows for a common dispute settlement 
system, as well as mutually agreed guidelines that could be used. This can further produce a 
joint system of capacity-building for developing countries along with financial and 
technological transfer. Indeed Global Environmental Law provides an excellent platform for 
the global development and cooperation in relation to environmental law, but it seems as 
though this vision can only truly be realised if a GEO is established. This is because the idea 
of global environmental law allows for global uniformity in relation to matters pertaining to 
the global environment and the protection thereof. This concept allows for a global standard 
that is to be adhered to, and it is best suited to be implemented by way of a centralised global 
environmental organisation due to the global nature of issues covered. Thus, a GEO can 
effectively carry out the mandate of global environmental law, as a centralised point provides 
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an excellent point of departure which allows members and organisations to be in unison in 
respect of environmental matters. 
 
2.5. Transnational Environmental Law 
 
Transnational Environmental Law deals with the study of environmental law and governance 
beyond the state. It approaches legal and regulatory developments with an interest in the 
contribution of non-state actors and an awareness of the multi-level governance context in 
which contemporary environmental law unfolds in a global context.59 Transnational 
Environmental Law is a source of environmental law that seems to welcome and enrich our 
understanding of contemporary environmental law through comparative and cutting-edge 
interdisciplinary analysis. Transnational Environmental Law has a broad scope and it deals 
with a wide range of environmental issues, including climate change, biodiversity, emerging 
technologies, industrial pollution and waste management. It also promotes the exploration of 
the evolving dynamics between environmental law and other legal disciplines and aims to 
support and contribute to a new generation of environmental scholarship that will bridge 
geographical boundaries, scholarly styles and generations. This form of environmental law 
and governance seeks to attain the development of a new generation of environmental 
scholarship that will bridge existing divides.60 
Legitimacy plays an important role when dealing with ‘laws’ created by non-state actors.  
However, in the absence of radical cosmopolitan reform, many scholars argue that 
democratic legitimacy can nonetheless be improved with relaxed requirements for full-
fledged deliberative and democratic mechanisms. This is indeed fulfilled by way of 
transnational environmental law.61 Thus, they focus on the elements of legitimacy in 
democratic theory, such as accountability, transparency, access to participation, deliberation 
and, sometimes, fairness. As opposed to direct accountability to publics through elections, 
proposals are increasingly rooted in deliberative models of legitimating based on Habermas’ 
theory of communicative action, where legitimacy ideally requires that decisions rest on 
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‘good arguments’ made under conditions in which free and equal autonomous actors can 
challenge validity claims, seek a reasoned communicative consensus about their 
understandings of the situation and justifications for norms guiding their action, and are open 
to being persuaded.62 Whether arguments and justifications occur between state 
representatives, members of transnational organizations or individual citizens, legitimacy 
requires a situation where persuasion is possible and common understanding is the goal.63  
 
Non-Governmental Organisations (hereafter referred to as NGO’s) also play an important 
role in the deliberation of transnational environmental law. NGO’S have formal and informal 
roles in monitoring and implementation of the law itself. Transnational corporations have 
also significantly increased their participation and political organization in a variety of 
environmental governance forums.64 The problem between state and non-state actors 
however is exacerbated mainly because of unresolved tensions between the community of 
states and the broader transnational society. Global environmental governance is well 
advanced in recognizing that its legitimacy increasingly rests on authority being granted by 
the broader communities it addresses beyond state governments.65  
 
An attempt to build a legitimate form of environmental governance through a transnational 
network which includes transnational environmental law must not only generate legitimacy 
among those parties to these agreements, but it must also navigate existing rules of 
international law legitimated through inter-state processes as well as regulatory and social 
environments of nation-states.66 In this regard, the tension generated between state and non-
state actors in relation to environmental law and governance may continue to exist if a 
centralised body is not established for structural uniformity in terms of environmental law 
and environmental governance. 
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Chapter Three: Shortcomings of the Current System Which have led to the Proposal 
for a Global Environmental Organisation 
 
 
During the last decades, the environment has emerged as one of the main policy areas that 
need international attention. Today, it is well recognised that threats to the environment 
undermine the resource base of human development and well-being.67 There is widespread 
agreement that the current international environmental regime has outgrown its original 
design and that it is too complicated, incomplete, incoherent and inadequate to address 
effectively the global environmental challenges.68 Since proposals have been brought forward 
for the creation of a GEO, it is important to know why these proposals have come into 
existence and also what the problems with the previous systems are. Thus, the previous 
systems must be looked at in order for us to understand why the establishment of a new 
centralised GEO has been called for.  
In the following chapter, I will critically analyse the shortcomings of the current system 
which has led to the proposal of a GEO. There are various factors which have led to the 
degradation of global environmental governance itself. These factors have caused the current 
system to be fairly ineffective in nature and as a result, a gaping hole has been formed in the 
field of effective global environmental management and governance. Factors such as 
fragmentation and dilution of international law will be looked at. I will also highlight the 
imbalance that exists between the environmental regime and other regimes as well as the lack 
of institutional leadership, political will and commitment that is apparent today. These 
shortcomings have played a major role in environmental degradation because there has been 
no cohesion on the part of environmental actors when dealing with problems facing the 
environment. 
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3.1. Fragmentation and Dilution of International Law 
 
Fragmentation of international law has moved from the periphery to the centre of 
international legal debate over the past few decades.69 It emphasises the isolation and 
disconnect between regimes and institutions and has particular resonance within international 
environmental law. International environmental law is a complex regulatory field comprising 
multiple regimes and institutions giving rise to overlapping and, occasionally, conflicting 
legal and policy mandates.70 There has been a growing fragmentation of the international 
regulatory order as an ever-increasing number of regulatory institutions with overlapping 
jurisdictions compete for influence. Progress in connection with the democratisation of 
international institutions has been all but negligible.71  
There are over 500 global and regional Multilateral Environmental Agreements (hereafter 
referred to as MEAs) in force today, and whilst this arguably represents one measure of 
success in responding to environmental degradation, the number of new treaties now in force 
has also led to criticism that international environmental law is characterised by both ‘treaty 
congestion’ and fragmentation.72 Fragmentation has been described as leading to 
inefficiencies and a lack of synergy in relation to international environmental law and it has 
inconsistent or contradictory standards within its foundations and it even jeopardises the 
credibility, reliability and, consequently, the authority of international law.73 Fragmentation 
of international environmental law arising from the creation of multiple regimes and 
institutions with similar or conflated regulatory mandates is extant, and has undoubtedly 
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given rise to the risk of duplication, divergence, and even conflict between environmental 
standards and obligations.74  
Fragmentation is more serious than it is commonly assumed to be because it functions to 
maintain and even extend the disproportionate influence of a handful of powerful states and 
the domestic interests that shape their foreign policies on the international regulatory order, 
and it tends to undermine the operation of the decentralized processes of the governing of 
international environmental law.75 
Fragmentation limits the ability of weaker states to form a countervailing coalition by 
engaging in logrolling.76 Weaker actors are invariably more numerous than powerful ones in 
any political context and their preferences are typically more diverse. This makes it difficult 
for them to achieve a consensus on a particular issue.77 At the domestic level, they frequently 
overcome this problem by logrolling or trading votes across issues. However, logrolling 
requires a venue that fosters reciprocity such as a legislature where policy decisions are made 
on a wide range of issues within a given session or over a relatively short period of time. 
These policy decisions are made to the extent that powerful parties are able to forestall the 
emergence of such a venue by creating a fragmented system of multiple, issue-specific 
venues that compete with each other or sabotage the operation of an existing one they 
preserve the bargaining advantage that they currently possess.78 This clearly shows the need 
for a more structured centralised institution of governance for international environmental 
law. By allowing the powers that be to gain more power and influence in the environmental 
sector, it will cause unfairness to arise to those nations and actors that truly need just and 
equitable environmental governance. This unfair balance of power will indeed cause many 
problems (as already seen) if a proper centralised institution ceases to exist. 
Fragmentation also creates a multitude of competing institutions with overlapping 
responsibilities that dramatically limit the ability of international legal bodies to reintegrate 
the system. It raises the costs of negotiating a detailed agreement dramatically and makes it 
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more difficult to achieve even an informal consensus. Fragmentation further provides 
powerful states with the opportunity to abandon or threaten to abandon any given venue for a 
more sympathetic one which further exacerbates the competition between institutions. This is 
not the kind of environment in which the bottom-up process of constitution-making on the 
part of international tribunals is likely to thrive.79  
The phenomenon of fragmentation of international law and the difficulties arising from its 
expansion and diversification have been extensively analysed by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) for the international law system as a whole,80 but it is undoubtedly also a 
key challenge for the current international environmental regime.81 The fact that the 
international community has dealt with environmental problems on an ad hoc,82 piecemeal 
and issue-by-issue basis has led to institutional proliferation, with partial solutions on the one 
hand, and important gaps in international environmental policy on the other hand. A survey 
by the UN High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence revealed in 2006 that 
the three Rio Conventions alone had up to 230 meeting days each year alone and that if seven 
other major global treaties were added, that number would rise to almost 400 days per year. 
Effective participation at all these meetings poses a fundamental challenge for countries, 
especially for developing countries. This proliferation of institutions is not only costly, it also 
leads to duplications, overlaps, turf battles and contradictions. The system’s piecemeal 
character suggests an absence of design and obscures the role of intentionality, which frees 
the powerful states from having to assume responsibility for the system’s shortcomings (its 
democratic deficit).83  
Dilution is also another factor which is hindering the current global environmental system. 
Dilution refers to the act of a lessening of a real value by causing a decrease in its relative 
worth.84 This institutional mushrooming and fragmentation within the global environmental 
regime is further worsened by the fact that many of the most important decisions affecting the 
environment occur outside the complex web of international environmental treaties, 
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institutions and processes.85 The fact that only the elite remain ‘in the loop’ is extremely 
concerning to developing countries and countries affected by environmental issues. Indeed 
policy must be made inclusive to all, as international environmental law is a sphere of the law 
that is applicable to all nations and powers, and not just a select few. The current system must 
be changed in order to allow for a more inclusive and effective measure for the governing of 
international environmental law. 
 
3.2. Imbalance between the Environmental Regime and Other Regimes  
 
International environmental law is ever-changing, constantly expanding, and extremely 
intriguing to say the least. When decisions and collaborations occur between nations across 
international boundaries and treaties or agreements are made to cooperate for environmental 
concerns, disputes inevitably transpire because of trade implications for the respective 
nations, safety concerns and cleanliness of environmental resources among shared borders, or 
problems with enforcement mechanisms for liability under agreements or treaty provisions 
relating to the environment.86 The fact that there are so many actors involved in international 
environmental law (state and non-state actors) causes some confusion when the actual 
implementation and governance of international environmental law must take place. The 
vastness of this area of international law includes the environmental sub-issues of population, 
biodiversity, global climate change, ozone depletion, preserving the Antarctic regions, 
movement of toxic and hazardous substances, land or vessel-based pollution, dumping, 
conservation of marine living resources, trans-boundary air and water pollution, 
desertification, and nuclear damage, among others.87 As one can see, there are many aspects 
in international environmental law.  
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There is an imbalance between the environmental regime and other regimes. The 
international environmental regime is significantly weaker than other regimes due to the fact 
that there are so many agreements and treaties at an international level. It is indeed very hard 
to keep track of every agreement that is made and implemented on a daily basis. International 
environmental law is so vast and contains many different provisions dealing with many 
different and specific topics. Other regimes on the other hand mainly deal with one specific 
topic and there is not a proliferation as diverse as in international environmental law. Thus, 
the environmental regime generally provides for rather weak obligations, is not equipped 
with the same quantity of resources and effective structures as other regimes, and lacks an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism.88 Other legal regimes are more content-specific as 
compared to international environmental law.  
International environmental law also has many linkages with other aspects of the law which 
in turn creates a further imbalance and confusion in the spectrum of international 
environmental law itself. If one looks at an example, there is indeed an inherent inter-linkage 
between the emergence of democracy and the appearance of environmental policy. 
Environmental governance is sufficiently based on democratic institutional principles and 
public participation and whether public participation in environmental decision making is 
promoting the effectiveness of environmental policies remains to be seen as other regimes of 
law do not exercise the public aspect as much as environmental policy making does.89 This 
further amplifies the volume of international environmental law and adds to its complexities 
and vastness. 
The imbalance is mainly caused as a result of the sheer magnitude dealt with in international 
environmental law as opposed to other branches of law. Effective implementation of these 
policies dealing with its own specific issues is very hard to keep track of. This as a result 
causes the implementation of these policies to be ineffective as it is sometimes unclear or just 
too much to keep track of. The fact that there are also inter-linkages with other facets of the 
law creates further imbalances as previously stated, and this in turn creates an even greater 
endless gyre of the aspects that international environmental law covers.  
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Also, the United Nations Environment Programme has not succeeded in becoming the central 
forum for debate and deliberation in the environmental field. This is where environmental 
governance has not been as successful as compared to trade which has a centralised body in 
the form of the World Trade Organization or health which has a centralised body in the form 
of the World Health Organization.90 This difficulty in governance is indeed what leads to 
ineffective implementation of law. As a result, the need for a centralised institution for 
international environmental governance becomes even greater. If an institution of this nature 
comes into operation, it can allow for the organisation and categorisation of all these laws and 
treaties. A global centralised environmental institution can further conduct seminars which 
can enlighten and educate members and other states about all the relevant laws and policies 
that are in existence in relation to international environmental law. This will indeed create 
conformity and understanding for international environmental law itself, similar to the 
conformity and understanding that exists in other aspects of the law. 
 
3.3. Lack of Institutional Leadership 
 
The United Nations Environment Programme (hereafter referred to as UNEP) is intended to 
be regarded as the focal centre of environmental governance on a global scale. UNEP was in 
essence the result of a negotiation process in which Sweden and the United States took the 
lead and largely designed the blueprint for the organizational structure and functions. The key 
premise of the institutional negotiations was that the work in the field of environment needed 
a common outlook and direction.91 What was necessary was a central co-ordinating 
mechanism in the United Nations to provide political and conceptual leadership in the United 
Nations system, to contemplate methods of avoiding or reducing global environmental risks, 
methods of working out joint norms, where there is agreement that such are needed, and 
methods of avoiding or settling conflicts between states on environmental matters. Such a 
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mechanism should be given enough authority and resources to ensure effective co-ordination 
of ongoing and planned activities.92  
While UNEP has been relatively effective with regard to monitoring and assessment, and 
launching environmental agreements, it has fallen short in managing policy processes in a 
coherent and coordinated manner.93 UNEP’s visionary capacity was seriously damaged 
during and after the Rio Earth Summit as the organization lost its leading role in the 
environmental field. The creation of the Global Environment Facility and the Commission for 
Sustainable Development detracted from UNEP’s authority as an anchor institution, mainly 
through financial superiority and convening power in a key location.94 
The lack of institutional leadership within the international environment regime is a major 
issue that contributes to the hindrance of the effective implementation of the current system. 
Today, there is no sufficiently strong and authoritative institution able to give overarching 
policy guidance on policy development and on concrete action for the protection of the 
environment and to successfully promote coherence, effectiveness and efficiency in the 
international environment regime. Several factors have contributed to UNEP’s inability to 
fulfil its role, including the limitation of its authority due to its formal status as a Programme 
rather than a specialised Agency and the limited membership of its governing body, its lack 
of adequate, stable and predictable financial resources, its governance structure and its 
location in Nairobi.95 Fragmentation and the resulting duplication among the various 
monitoring and assessment activities within UNEP have inhibited it from becoming the 
anchor institution for the myriad such activities within the international system. Within 
UNEP, activities regarding information and scientific assessment spread across all eight 
divisions of the organization. Collection, processing, and dissemination of information are 
further allocated to a number of other UNEP-operated global scientific data centres. This 
problem is compounded at the international level where duplication of environmental 
assessments performed by other UN agencies and NGOs abounds. Stakeholders recognise 
this as a serious problem, yet there is little discussion to address the reasons for the failure to 
effectively coordinate activities and to formulate concrete strategies to overcome existing 
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constraints.96 Collaboration and coordination do not just happen. They have to be 
encouraged, facilitated, and sustained. This requires a fundamentally different system of 
incentives for international organizations and governments where long-term vision and 
strategy are rewarded over narrowly focused projects with immediate outputs, which UNEP 
does not effectively carry out.97 
Other UN bodies have also refused to accept UNEP’s mandate in coordination of all 
environmental activities in the UN system due to institutional seniority. A number of the UN 
specialized agencies were active in the environmental field before UNEP was created and 
thus feel less of a need to defer to UNEP. UNEP’s approach to coordination was perceived as 
controlling and threatening. This has led to strained relations and turf wars among the 
agencies compromising UNEP’s role as an anchor institution managing broader policy 
processes. Subsequently, UNEP could no more be expected to ‘coordinate’ the system-wide 
activities of the UN than could a medieval monarch ‘coordinate’ his feudal barons.98 The 
ultimate result of this has been proliferation of institutional arrangements, substantial 
overlaps, unrecognized linkages and gaps hampering policy coherence and synergy and 
amplifying the negative impact of already limited resources.99  
International organisations have transformed from pure transaction mechanisms assisting 
countries in achieving collective goals to autonomous entities shaping preferences and 
delivering results.100 However, their legitimacy is being openly challenged as they are 
increasingly seen as “unelected elites [with] no sense of common peoplehood and trust.101 In 
the absence of direct elections at the international level, legitimacy cannot be granted through 
the traditional democratic representation channel. It is instead attained through expertise and 
the ability to generate “right answers,” through a systemic design of checks and balances, or 
through fair and transparent rulemaking procedures that instill confidence in the process and 
subsequent acceptance of the decision.102 International organizations are therefore likely to 
regain their legitimacy when they begin to effectively deliver results and to enact transparent, 
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accountable and participatory rules and processes. To this end, five root causes of 
institutional dysfunction need to be addressed.103 
There is also a lack of and inefficient use of limited resources. There are not sufficient 
resources available both in developed countries and to support developing countries and 
countries with economies in transition to implement effective environmental policies. 
Moreover, limited resources are not always managed efficiently. And the global 
environmental governance system loses money through funding contradictions, overlaps due 
to fragmentation and lack of synergies, lack of transparency, and duplications.104 
 
3.4. Lack of Political Will and Commitment  
 
Another issue that is prevalent is the lack of political will and commitment.105 Developed 
countries lack political will, not finance, to tackle environmental issues such as climate 
change and environmental degradation, according to the world's poorest countries.106 
Politicians who almost universally claim to be so well-informed that they can run countries, 
cannot also claim to be so ill-informed that they do not appreciate the gravity of the unfolding 
environmental crisis threatening the safety, security and economy of every nation on the 
planet.107  
Systemic shortcomings are not sufficient in themselves to explain why environmental 
deterioration continues to threaten life on earth. There are many examples of a lack of 
political commitment in international environment policy, namely, existing MEAs that are 
not ratified by important actors, most environmental agreements that are not supported with 
the necessary funds and means to fulfil their purpose, significant gaps that still remain such as 
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in the field of heavy metals, forests, water and liability rules, and several of the existing 
processes and MEAs still lack accepted rules of procedures or an agreed compliance 
mechanism.108 According to UNEP, political effort is suffering from treaty congestion.109 
World leaders have signed up to an impressive 500 internationally recognised agreements in 
the past 50 years. After trade, environment is the most common area of global rule-making. 
However, of the 90 agreements that UNEP deemed the most important, some progress 
occurred in only 40 agreements, little or no progress occurred in 24 agreements and further 
deterioration occurred in 8 goals to be achieved, and an ominous no data was available for 14 
other agreements.110 Strong and effective regimes and institutions can to a certain extent 
trigger and support political will and can function even in the absence of political will.111  
If the reasons for non-performance lie primarily in the lack of collective political will to 
effectively address environment challenges, then institutional design will not of itself solve 
the problems. At the same time, lack of political will is no good excuse for non-action as it is 
not a given factor but one that can be influenced. It can indeed be influenced by those in 
charge of the political institutions itself, especially when they are trying to implement their 
own agendas not even related to environmental matters. Urgency is required when dealing 
with environmental protection on a political level, and elected officials of political 
organisations that run countries must ensure that they place environmental protection on their 
agendas of concern. All these factors pose a fundamental challenge to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the current international environmental regime. They lead to a lack of 
coordination, cooperation and synergies among relevant international actors. It also leads to 
duplications, overlaps, inefficiencies, turf battles, inconsistencies, contradictions and 
conflicts; to a lack of an overarching vision, of a common orientation and strategy, and of 
coherence and focus; to a lack of visibility; and finally to inadequate goals and measures.112 
Surely political leaders must know this. They cannot circulate in the company of advisors, 
strategists, civil servants, academics, scientists, diplomats and fellow politicians without 
considering in their political calculus the worsening environmental situation. They must be 
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briefed by experts before they attend international meetings to discuss climate change, 
species loss, ocean overfishing, ozone depletion and the widening list of ecological worries 
that should haunt a normal conscience. These concerns indeed demand immediate 
preventative action. In essence however is that underlying all these explanations and 
rationalisations is an absolute lack of political will.113  
Today, there is, as formulated by the UN General Assembly, broad recognition of the need 
for more efficient environmental activities in the United Nations system, with enhanced 
coordination, improved policy advice and guidance, strengthened scientific knowledge, 
assessment and cooperation, better treaty compliance and a better integration of 
environmental activities in the broader sustainable development framework and agreement to 
explore the possibility of a more coherent institutional framework to approach this need, 
including a more integrated structure.114 The lack of political will is often mentioned as an 
explanation for weak environmental governance. However, through the clever mobilisation of 
political actors to perform governance components, states may be induced to develop a 
stronger will to co-operate and protect the international environment.115  
The shortcomings of GEG are analyzed in terms of the inability of international organizations 
to coordinate activities and the failure of national governments to implement treaties. As a 
result, the traditional approach to GEG reform often overlooks the tremendous contribution 
and increasing involvement of civil society actors and the private sector in international 
policy-making, capacity building and implementation.116 NGOs are playing an increasingly 
large role, not just as stakeholders, but as ‘motors’ of international environmental policy-
making through setting agendas, drafting treaties, providing scientific information and 
monitoring implementation.117 Local and international NGOs also engage in implementation 
and capacity building. In addition to the achievements of civil society, great strides have been 
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made in engaging the private sector as partners in development and environmental protection 
rather than as culprits of environmental degradation.118  
As a result, the system as it currently stands cannot hold this entity of international policies, 
agreements, treaties, obligations, rules and laws without starting to burst at the seams. The 
magnitude of international environmental legislature currently circulating today is indeed 
overwhelming to be effectively implemented by the system as it currently stands. These 
shortcomings paint a clear picture of how international environmental governance is lacking a 
centralised institution with the necessary powers for decision-making and policy-
implementing. The system as it currently stands must be improved in order for international 
environmental governance to be improved.  
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Chapter Four: Models for the Creation of a Specialised Global Environmental 
Organisation in Order to Achieve Better Global Environmental Governance 
 
Improving global environmental governance has been an issue of dynamic debate in 
academic and policy-making circles ever since environmental issues entered the international 
agenda in the 1970s. The key challenge of global environmental governance has, however, 
remained the same, namely, how to design an institutional framework that would best protect 
the global environment. A few approaches have been conceptualised.119 
Many scholars have opined for the creation of a centralised, specialised Global 
Environmental Organisation in order to address the shortcomings of global environmental 
governance as previously highlighted in Chapter Three of this composition.  There have been 
certain models upon which the concept of a GEO has been adapted. Hence, this chapter will 
deal with the models that have been proposed for the creation of a specialised GEO.  
It is important to explore recommendations made for the various models of environmental 
governance. The compliance model, the organisational streamlining model, the multiple 
actors model, upgrading the United Nations Environment Programme model and the new 
agency model are the models that will each be analysed. Indeed one of these models should 
be used when deciding upon the ‘blueprint’ to create a GEO which will lead to better global 
environmental governance.  
 
4.1. The Compliance Model  
 
Environmental compliance and enforcement programs occur as part of a comprehensive 
environmental management cycle. This cycle typically involves community recognition of 
certain environmental problems and governmental acceptance of the need to address these 
problems. From there it often leads to government establishing specific environmental goals 
to address these problems and selecting a management approach or approaches to reach those 
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goals.120 When developing mandatory requirements, government must consider the legal 
basis for these requirements and establish compliance and enforcement programs to ensure 
that the regulated community adheres to these requirements. Once implementation begins, 
evaluations and adjustments must be made to continually update and improve the 
programs.121 
There are two different government approaches to achieving compliance, often referred to 
colloquially in English as the carrot and the stick, which together both encourage and compel 
behavioural change.122 The carrot (compliance promotion activities) and the stick (the threat 
of an enforcement action against non-compliers) are based on the rationalists and normative 
models of behaviour. The rationalist theory states that regulated actors follow the logic of 
consequence. Put simply, everyone acts to maximize their own self-interest. If it is cheaper to 
violate an environmental requirement, then regulated actors will do so. Therefore, rationalists 
argue that policies must deter this behaviour by raising the costs of non-compliance.123 
Accordingly, they advocate deterrence-based enforcement. Thus, there is a high probability 
of being caught, the response to violations will be swift, certain, and fair and the punishment 
will be severe enough to outweigh the benefits of non-compliance.124 Deterrence may be 
enhanced either by expanding monitoring activities, improving enforcement capacity to 
investigate and prosecute violations, raising penalties, or increasing awareness of 
enforcement. Indeed if mechanisms of compliance are put in place, it will allow for better 
environmental governance as states will be bound to the various rules that are put in place. 
Penalties for non-compliance act as a great tool for preventing non-compliance to actually 
take place, as those who break the rules would have to be held accountable and responsible 
for their actions. These types of mechanisms ensure that people ‘think twice’ before they act. 
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Normative theory suggests that regulated actors follow the logic of appropriateness and often 
act in good faith. Compliance occurs (or does not occur) largely because of the regulated 
actor’s capacity and commitment.125  
 The compliance model advocates for the creation of a body that could provide binding 
decisions to hold states and private actors accountable for non-compliance with Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (hereafter referred to as MEAs) and resulting environmental 
damage. Several potential bodies with such enforcement powers have been proposed of 
which a World Environment Court is an example.126 A World Environment Court is 
envisioned as a permanent institution along the lines of the European Court of Human Rights, 
to ensure compliance with MEAs and upholding the a new right to a healthy environment if it 
were ever to be created. The compliance model would solve the free rider problem,127 ensure 
care for the global commons, match judicial enforcement available elsewhere (especially in 
the WTO), enhance predictability and intergenerational concern of environmental law and 
directly impact compliance with MEAs. In practice, states are reluctant to expose themselves 
to the compliance body’s oversight and value judgments.128  
A compliance and enforcement program that is effective and part of a larger environmental 
management effort will bring a broad range of benefits to society. A well-designed 
environmental compliance and enforcement program will create both public and private 
value.129 Compliance creates public value when it promotes the rule of law and good 
governance. The rule of law is essential to good governance and sustainable development. 
When individuals or organizations ignore an environmental requirement, they are not just 
hurting the environment, but also damaging the rule of law in that jurisdiction. Indeed 
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corruption and legal uncertainty foster widespread non-compliance, environmental or 
otherwise, and vice-versa, eroding the norms and values that constitute healthy societies.130  
Compliance also ensures fairness and strengthens the credibility of environmental 
requirements.131 A consistent and effective compliance and enforcement program helps 
ensure that actors affected by environmental requirements are treated fairly. Without an 
effective compliance assurance program, actors who violate environmental requirements may 
benefit compared to actors who choose to comply. Ultimately, actors will be more likely to 
comply if they perceive that the requirements are fair and do not place them at a competitive 
disadvantage.132  
The compliance model protects the goods and services provided to a society by a well-
functioning ecosystem.133 Compliance assurance protects natural resources so they can 
continue to provide valuable goods and services to society, including renewable natural 
resources, climate stability, clean air, and fresh water.134  
The compliance model also allows for the protection of public health.135 In Europe alone, air 
pollution is responsible for over 300,000 premature deaths each year. Pollution imposes a 
substantial social cost in terms of increased health care expenses and employee absenteeism. 
Strong compliance assurance helps improve public health, economic productivity, and the 
environment.136 
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On the other side of the coin, compliance can also create private value when it increases 
investor confidence by reducing business risks. Widespread non-compliance is often tied to 
corruption and legal uncertainty, which can have devastating impacts on economic 
development. Firms will be less willing to make investments and assume risks when their 
legal rights and responsibilities remain uncertain. An effective compliance assurance program 
promotes certainty through the rule of law, thereby helping foster an attractive investment 
climate.137 
It can stimulate innovation and increased competitiveness and creates new jobs and 
markets.138 Environmental requirements can often save businesses money by stimulating 
innovation, leading to improvements in product design and manufacturing processes. These 
innovations improve pollution prevention strategies and energy efficiency efforts and result 
in reductions in waste. Numerous studies indicate that countries with high environmental 
standards often have market-leading firms and better economic performance than those with 
lower standards. Compliance assurance also creates jobs in new industries. The most visible 
beneficiary is the environmental goods and services sector, which includes, among other 
things, pollution abatement technology, waste management, organic products, eco -certified 
resources, and eco-tourism. These are among the fastest growing industries in the world.139 
Although each country and jurisdiction faces a unique set of political, economic, social and 
culture issues, certain general principles have emerged as to what constitutes an effective 
compliance and enforcement program. Understanding these principles will allow 
governments and civil society to better evaluate and adapt their environmental compliance 
and enforcement programs to meet the challenges of the world that we live in.140 Thus, if a 
compliance mechanism can be incorporated when designing the structure of a new GEO, it 
can indeed allow for better enforceability and accountability, which will in turn allow for 
better global environmental governance. This is due to the fact that nations will now be held 
accountable and responsible for acts that cause damage to the environment.  
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4.2. The Organisational Streamlining Model 
 
The Organisational Streamlining Model addresses the need for improved co-ordination and 
synergies among various entities within the system of global environmental governance.141 
This model mainly seeks co-ordination among MEAs and respecting authority and autonomy 
of secretariats and Conference of the Parties (hereafter referred to as COPs) bodies.142  
This particular model calls for synergies and linkages of environmental issues to occur by 
way of clustering agreements. There are indeed two divisions that can occur, namely, division 
by way of sector and division by way of function.143 Clusters can also be issue-based, 
functional or organisational, or they can have a particular regional scope. This model is meant 
for improving co-ordination and it is a work in progress and an ongoing challenge within the 
United Nations system. Integrating environmental institutions into clusters (or clustering) has 
been discussed as a way to achieve goals of environmental conventions, while also pursuing 
efficiency gains and improving coherence of environmental governance.144  
Division by way of sector mainly deals with dividing environmental issues according to 
different categories.145 Therefore, all agreements dealing with one specific matter of the 
environment will be grouped or clustered together. This allows for better control on issues 
and agreements relating to that one particular sphere of the environment. By separating 
different environmental issues, this model does allow for more coherence and structure to the 
global environmental governance regime. It allows for parties to have a point of access and 
point of departure when dealing with a particular issue of the environment. Division by way 
of sector allows for biodiversity related matters, marine related matters, chemicals and 
hazardous waste related matters and atmosphere and energy related matters to be grouped 
separately in order to allow for more coherence. This in turn allows for matters to be dealt 
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with efficiently and time-wasting will most certainly be reduced, as there is a better structure 
in place in relation to the organisation of the various environmental policies and agreements 
for that particular environmental matter.146 
Division by way of function mainly deals with trade-related matters. The main objective here 
is to refer to certain protocols or agreements that have been made which deal with 
environmental law (such as CITES, the Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention) and 
look for matters dealing with implementation and enforcement. Division by way of function 
allows for proper implementation to take place, as all enforcement mechanisms from these 
agreements are clustered in order to ensure actual enforcement and implementation in 
practice if need be.147 
The Organisational Streamlining Model increases visibility of environmental protection, 
promotes specialisation and innovation, and increases commitments of states that host 
secretariats. Some degree of redundancy is also desirable as it functions as insurance against 
institutional decline.148 In order for this model to be effective, COPs meetings must indeed be 
rescheduled and be of shorter duration with back to back parallel conferences. This allows 
one to keep better track of all the agreements taking place in international environmental law. 
This model also calls for the scientific co-operation and holistic approach through joint 
programs of different sectors when dealing with environmental matters.149 
The major issue with this model is that it does not deal with core issues of international 
environmental law and governance, namely, universality, public participation, finance and 
authority.150 It mainly deals with the actual re-structuring of the institutional body. This 
model is indeed very good if one is looking to re-structure and organize the current system in 
order to be more effective and efficient, however, this model does not bring something ‘new’ 
or ‘inventive’ to the fore. It mainly calls for the organizational structuring of the structure that 
is already in place. It mainly seeks to organize agreements that are already in place to allow 
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for more efficiency in current environmental governance. Although these aspects are also 
necessary in order to ensure effective environmental governance, it does not seem to be the 
most ‘groundbreaking’ innovation for global environmental governance reform.   
 
4.3. The Multiple Actors Model 
 
The Multiple Actors Model argues that the system of governance is made up of multiple 
actors whose actions need to be mutually reinforcing and better co-ordinated in order to 
ensure coherence and structure in global environmental governance. Without better 
integration of these multiple actors, organisational re-arrangement cannot resolve institutional 
problems.151 A multiplicity of actors and interactions form a multi-dimensional system of 
global environmental governance. It includes states, international environmental 
organizations, related international organizations, civil society organizations, and public 
concern and action.152  Focus on organisations as a single dimension of governance distracts 
attention from the fact that institutional will is required to affect decision-making procedures 
and change institutional boundaries.153 One must also be cognisant of the fact that various 
actors play various roles in global environmental governance. It would therefore be of the 
best interest to not exclude them, but to rather include their points of view in the global 
spectrum of environmental governance.  
The multiple actors model mainly calls for the co-operation of all the relevant parties 
involved in global environmental law and governance. If all parties are on the same page, it 
will then allow for better coherence and structure in the global system as a whole because all 
the relevant actors will be aware of what the other is thinking and how they can move 
forward together. This model calls for the interaction and transaction of all the various actors’ 
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involved in global environmental law and governance. It calls for the integration of the 
environment into the larger context of sustainable development and also calls for allowing 
multiple organisations to flourish together. 
 This model also calls for the creation of multiple channels of implementation. Indeed the 
quality of global environmental governance will be determined by the interaction of the 
various actors involved.154 Parties would be tackling the same issues at the same time and 
differences in opinion can be easily sorted out if the parties get together and discuss their 
various views. Co-operation by all the actors is of the utmost importance in order to achieve 
the goal of global environmental protection and governance. This model however cannot 
stand on its own. It can be regarded as an aspect or facet that must be integrated into a much 
larger regime-changing model for global environmental governance. The ideologies 
envisaged in this model must be used in order to achieve total co-operation and structure for 
global environmental governance. There should be a realisation that there are indeed many 
actors involved in global environmental law and global environmental governance. This is 
something that will not change as the environment is the concern of every human being. The 
fact that so many actors exist in global environmental law makes it quite challenging to keep 
track of what every single actor is doing at any given time. There must be some balance, 
conformity and uniformity in global environmental law and global environmental 
governance. True uniformity can only be achieved if all actors come together and the best 
way to do this is to create a new centralised GEO to bring them all together. When all the 
parties involved in global environmental governance act together and make decisions 
together, it will result in a GEO that has actual authority in the manner in which it governs 
matters relating to the environment. It will also result in a more efficient system of global 
environmental governance as there is cohesion amongst everyone involved. Current disunity 
must be converted into future unity, in order to ensure the future of the environment as we 
know it. If all actors work together under one body, global environmental governance can 
only become better and more efficient, and this in turn will combat pressing environmental 
issues, such as environmental degradation that we are currently faced with today.  
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4.4. Upgrading the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Model 
 
This model takes UNEP as a departure point for improving environmental governance and 
suggests upgrading it to a specialised agency to strengthen its status.155 As a result of the 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the UN General Assembly established 
UNEP as the central United Nations node for global environmental co-operation and treaty 
making. The resolution also established the UNEP Governing Council to provide a forum for 
the international community to address major and emerging environmental policy issues. The 
responsibilities of the governing council were to ensure the promotion of international 
environmental co-operation and the recommendation of policies to achieve it, and the 
provision of policy guidance for the direction and co-ordination of environmental 
programmes in the United Nations system.156 
UNEP itself has been both an active participant and a focus of the reform debate. It has faced 
significant challenges since its creation (limiting legal mandate, lack of funds, location). The 
most broadly discussed proposal is upgrading UNEP to a specialized agency so that it can 
adopt treaties, have its own budget and potentially use innovative financial mechanisms. 
UNEP would strengthen its role as an ‘anchor’ institution for global environment by drawing 
on its ability to serve as information and capacity clearinghouse and set broad policy 
guidelines for action within the Global Ministerial Environment Forum (hereafter referred to 
as GMEF).157 Similarly, it has been suggested that UNEP could be upgraded into a 
decentralized United Nations Environment Organization (hereafter referred to as UNEO).158 
The UNEO would have its own legal identity, and would comprise general assembly, 
executive structure and secretariat. It would incorporate UNEP and the GMEF and take up 
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UNEP’s mandate with respect to its normative function, and it will also serve as the authority 
for environment within the UN system.159 
In order for UNEP to be upgraded, a model has been established which supplements the 
current mandate in two directions, namely, investing UNEP with extended decision-making 
power applicable to those MEAs that choose to participate in such arrangements, and 
establishing new tasks for UNEP that can be associated with establishing a High 
Commissioner for the Environment.160 
In order to ensure that UNEP is upgraded in such a way that it effectively achieves its 
intended purpose, UNEP must be given extended decision-making power. Problems of 
investing UNEP with decision-making power are related to differences in contracting parties 
to the MEAs, ranging between 114 and 196, and differences in the links established between 
MEAs and third-party actors, such as NGOs. The main problem in granting UNEP extended 
decision-making power is that there is no common structure that defines rights and 
obligations of MEAs for the various parties that have agreed to it.161 Also, if the UNEP 
Governing Council is invested with decision-making power, non-parties may take part in 
decisions concerning MEAs and this could cause further confusion in effective decision-
making. Investing the UNEP Governing Council with decision-making power would require 
amending the relevant MEAs which could also cause further problems and delays.162   
In order for UNEP to be efficiently upgraded, its tasks should also be upgraded in order to 
ensure effective environmental governance. The tasks of monitoring and assessing follow-up 
and of recommending action to address shortcomings can be designed so that they would not 
overlap significantly with the tasks of other institutions.163  
The task of coordinating and mainstreaming environmental protection throughout the United 
Nations could overlap with the tasks of other bodies, including MEAs.  This will therefore 
have to be addressed in order to prevent overlapping and thus save time. 
                                                          
159
 Najam A. Papa M. & Taiyab N., (2006), Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development, (Winnipeg, Canada), page 19. 
160
 Fauchald O.K., (2010), International Environmental Governance – A Legal Analysis of Selected Options, 
Fridtjof Nansen Institute FNI Report 16/2010, page 10. 
161
 Ibid at page vi. 
162
 Ibid. 
163
 Fauchald O.K., (2010), International Environmental Governance – A Legal Analysis of Selected Options, 
Fridtjof Nansen Institute FNI Report 16/2010, page 10. 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
The task of functioning as an addressee and clearing house for decisions of other agencies 
and bodies of the United Nation regarding issues that fall within the scope of MEAs can be 
accommodated through agreements between UNEP and the relevant agency or body, and 
would, from a legal perspective, not require the MEA in question to be involved. The task of 
performing periodic environmental policy reviews could be related to efforts to harmonise 
existing report mechanisms, as long as such reviews do not focus on implementation of or 
compliance with specific provisions of MEAs. The task of responding to environmental 
emergencies should be considered in light of current instruments set up for such purposes 
under specialized agencies of the United Nations. They would need to be treaty-based to the 
extent that measures would interfere with the sovereignty of countries. The task of providing 
services or assistance to countries upon request would not need consent from treaty bodies. 
Upgrading UNEP requires less financial and diplomatic investment than adding a completely 
new organization. While UNEP has a record of institutional success and learning, its potential 
to perform when given better legal status, more funds and more staff is promising.164 The 
current debate on environmental governance seems to converge around the proposal to 
upgrade UNEP into a specialized agency as a middle ground between making a major change 
in the system and doing nothing.165 This model seeks to strengthen UNEP rather than have it 
replaced by a different organisation altogether. Indeed upgrading UNEP can be seen as the 
easiest way in ensuring effective global environmental governance as it does not require as 
much effort as other models for global environmental governance reform. UNEP is an 
existing body and by identifying its shortcomings, it would be easier to find solutions to 
rectify what has gone wrong. This is regarded as the best way forward if the global world of 
environmental governance does not want to start from scratch and wants to build on 
something that is already in existence. Upgrading UNEP will indeed save a lot of time, 
money, resources and infrastructure, but is it really a good idea to build on something that has 
not been working for the past few years? There are many factors for and against upgrading 
UNEP, however the fact remains that in order to achieve the ultimate goal of effective global 
environmental governance, the parties involved must assess where the system currently 
stands today, and assess what is the best way forward. Upgrading UNEP can be seen as a 
‘shortcut’ to achieving effective global environmental governance, but the question still 
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remains whether or not this ‘shortcut’ will truly lead to actual effectiveness and 
implementation, given what has gone on before. This model may indeed form part of a 
solution in combating the current shortcomings of global environmental governance in part, 
but it will most probably not address all of the issues and shortcomings that have arisen in 
global environmental governance. Thus, it seems as though it would be better to move on in a 
new direction in order to achieve better and more efficient global environmental governance.  
 
3.5. The New Agency Model 
 
The New Agency Model refers to creating a new organisation outside UNEP with 
concentrated environmental responsibilities and the ability to steer UN agencies in relation to 
environmental issues.166 When someone offers to replace existing organisational 
arrangements with a new and improved architecture, one instinctively asks, what is it that is 
so bad about the old or so different about the new.167 From the previous chapter, we have 
seen what is bad about the old system and how in fact the old system is not allowing for the 
effective implementation and control of global environmental governance. 
The New Agency model is seen to be the most ambitious of all the other models in terms of 
global environmental governance as it requires the most work and effort in order to achieve a 
radical change from the current state of environmental governance as implemented today. A 
distinct set of actor groups has emerged over the last thirty years. Traditional nation states, 
international organisations, non-governmental organisations, multinational companies and 
scientists have all emerged as significant actors in international environmental governance.168  
These parties would all have to be integrated into one centralised regime which could prove a 
daunting task indeed. This model requires the complete restructuring of the current UNEP 
system and the current environmental governance system as a whole in order to create a new 
centralised body for the controlling and implementation of global environmental law. Indeed 
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this body will require all the current systems to be integrated into one authoritative system, 
which will then be regarded as the central point of control for global environmental 
governance. The logistics involved in realising this objective seems to be very complex. It 
requires many parties and NGO’s to stand together and be willing to work together in order to 
achieve a common goal, namely, effective environmental protection and governance.  
The new agency model would invariably result in the establishment of a World Environment 
Organisation (hereafter referred to as a WEO). The establishment of a WEO as a specialised 
agency will require negotiation of a separate treaty and would have to involve all relevant 
parties and actors who partake in global environmental management.169 A decision to 
commence negotiation of a WEO treaty in order to establish a WEO, including a mandate for 
the negotiations, could be made by the United Nations General Assembly upon 
recommendation from the Economic and Social Council (hereafter referred to as ECOSOC) 
or from the UNEP Governing Council or an independent group of experts.170 It would be best 
that an established body dealing with environmental matters take the initiative in order to 
create and establish a new body in the form of a WEO for the governing of international 
environmental law. 
A WEO will be assumed to have functions similar to those of an upgraded UNEP. While the 
same functions are relevant, the specific design of the functions may differ due to the 
different roles of UNEP as a subsidiary body within the United Nations and a WEO as a 
specialised agency.171 One basic challenge in the context of this model is that it might take 
time for states to join a WEO, and some states may choose not to join. In order to achieve 
near-universal membership as quickly as possible, a WEO treaty will be limited to 
establishing basic institutional structures and procedures, with few substantive provisions.172 
Moreover, in order to make it possible for existing MEAs with almost universal membership 
to become formally related to the WEO treaty, it is assumed that the WEO will generally not 
have authority to take decisions directly binding on the MEAs. Indeed if a WEO were to be 
established, certain issues that remain in today’s current system would have to be ironed out. 
During the treaty phase for the establishment of a WEO, the parties involved would have to 
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discuss the substantive, institutional or procedural requirements in the WEO treaty with 
possible implications for existing MEAs as well as the co-ordinating of the decision-making 
processes of MEAs with decisions made by the WEO.173  
However, there have been proposals for a new agency that does not require starting from 
scratch. The ideals of current organisations can be combined to form one enormous entity of 
efficient and complete global environmental governance. The proposal for a new agency 
requires the joining of environmental and development programs and agencies. One of the 
main proposals include the creating of a Global Environmental Organisation, modelled after 
the WTO, with broad rule-making authority to address market failures and facilitate 
negotiation of international standards to be implemented by all countries. Other designs use 
the Global Environment Facility as a role model for governance and to advocate for the 
strengthening of the role of ECOSOC in discussing and overseeing system-wide 
coordination.174  
 The creation of a new agency is an opportunity to put together the best features of existing 
agencies and guide global environmental policy-making.175 Such an agency could address the 
problems of fragmentation and weakness of environmental governance within the UN 
system. However, putting all environmental agreements under one umbrella would be a major 
challenge, because the current system is strongly decentralized and individual environmental 
entities strongly resist takeovers.176  
The new agency model does allow for a ‘clean-break’ of sorts. It is truly one of the best 
means to go forward in international environmental governance as it allows for true cohesion, 
coherence and co-operation among all the actors in global environmental law. In order to 
achieve this new agency, all actors need to be on board to the idea of an ‘extreme makeover’ 
for global environmental governance. In order for a new agency to develop, all the actors 
themselves must also develop and be willing to allow for change to occur. Parties must 
realise what the current state of global environmental governance is today and they must be 
willing to break free from it in order to achieve the actual goal of proper environmental 
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protection and governance. The new agency will be built from the ground up, which is the 
best way to go in order to ensure that all ideas and ideals of all the relevant actors are taken 
into account. By creating a new centralised agency for international environmental law, 
policy and governance, one will then have a focal point or hub where one can refer to for 
guidance and assistance in implementing environmental policy at a local level. The entire 
body can then handle all matters of global environmental concern at an international level. It 
would be a great initiative if ever undertaken, and it would require a mass amount of effort in 
order to achieve, but it can be seen as the best way of breaking away from the problems of the 
old system and moving towards a new system filled with solutions. Starting an initiative of 
this magnitude can be seen as an extremely daunting task, however if properly realised, this 
could just be the solution that global environment law and governance has been seeking all 
along. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
Some argue that environmental protection is too pressing and that we cannot afford the time 
for institutional reform. However, an increasing number of states have demonstrated support 
for reform, including the African Union, Small Island Developing States, Asia-Pacific states, 
the European Union, and other countries from every geographical location.177 The rapid 
increase of environmental degradation has caused much panic amongst the global community 
dealing with environmental matters. As we can see, there are many different parties involved 
in the governance of environmental matters on a national as well as international level 
however there is a massive lack of cohesion and uniformity in relation to decision making 
and implementation of proper international environmental agenda. Different ideologies and 
methodologies will inevitably clash, and this will only further deteriorate the environment 
which is already undergoing deterioration at an ever-increasing rate. Even though the threat 
of environmental depletion is rife, the combating of this depletion remains something that is 
merely spoken about rather than something that is actually being dealt with. 
In this composition I have dealt with the various forms of global environmental governance 
by way of Chapter Two. This was important so that we start to understand that there is no one 
fixed method to effective global governance. Various systems and instruments have been in 
place for many years, and it is important to know why these systems are there and what 
advantages and disadvantages they bring to effective environmental governance. 
Environmental degradation is a very serious matter, and it can be safely said that effective 
global environmental governance is indeed the necessary solution to combat the scourge of 
global environmental degradation. The types of governance are important to note as certain of 
these methods can actually be incorporated in the establishment of a GEO. A centralised 
GEO must indeed operate on a basic fundamental system of governance. 
Chapter Three of this composition dealt with the shortcomings that are evident in the current 
system. Indeed these shortcomings have resulted in proposals for a new centralised GEO to 
combat the underperformance of the current system. By knowing what went wrong with the 
previous regime, it allows the future system of control to be aware of those past mistakes and 
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problems in order to avoid those same mistakes and problems in the future. Thus, knowledge 
always serves as a great weapon in preventing a repeat of the past. A new GEO must consider 
what had happened before its establishment in order for it to be the ultimate answer to the 
saving of the environment for future generations. 
In Chapter Four, I discussed the various models that exist for the creation of a new 
centralised GEO. It is fairly simple to call for a new GEO however it is not as simple to 
actually create that GEO. Thus, these models serve as a blueprint for the foundations of the 
establishment of a new GEO for better and effective global environmental governance. I can 
safely say that the best way to combat global environmental degradation is by way of 
effective global environmental governance and management. I believe that the current system 
has not worked and as a result it would be better to start from scratch in relation to global 
environmental governance. In terms of recommendations based on the research, it is highly 
recommended that the international community adopt a new policy and approach in relation 
to global environmental governance. To address the surge of environmental degradation, 
environmental governance must be made stronger and more effective than it currently is. It 
would be best to involve all the actors in global environmental governance currently, and 
bring them together in order to discuss proposals for moving forward. The best way to move 
forward would be the New Agency Model. It allows for a ‘clean break’ from the systems that 
are currently in place and that have been in place before. By allowing for a new agency to be 
established, all the relevant actors in global environmental law can come together and bring 
their ideas and strategies to the fore. This combination of new methodologies, ideologies and 
resources from different spheres of the world will then allow for new methods to be 
developed in combating the surge of environmental degradation and it will allow for more 
effective and inclusive global environmental governance. Further, it should not be ignored 
that a new agency could provide a voice for a significantly larger portion of the world, not 
only by formalizing the voice of more states, but by formalising the relationship with civil 
society. Through a voting structure similar to the International Labour Organisation (ILO),178 
environmental groups could be granted an equal seat.179 The sustainable development field 
has long made special efforts to include civil society in decision making, and rightly so: civil 
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society brings important technical capacity and local knowledge, and expresses the interests 
of often overlooked peoples.180 
Indeed there are many advantages in establishing a new centralised GEO. An anchor 
institution can indeed reduce administrative costs of governmental institutions that are 
charged with protecting the environment, which is often a burden for developing countries. 
Diplomats today, for instance, attend technical meetings year-round in various countries 
across the globe. An anchor institution could relieve these burdens. Co-location and eventual 
joint administration of the many convention secretariats could help developing countries to 
build specialized ‘environmental embassies’ at the seat of the new organization.181  
In terms of implementation, a new body in the organization could financially and technically 
support developing and least developed countries to meet their MEA commitments. 
Currently, all eight of UNEP's divisions have the responsibility to monitor, assess, and report 
on their subfields, which is seen as an unnecessary redundancy. National reporting could be 
streamlined into one document, and submitted to one body. This move would use 
significantly less state administrative resources.182 
The establishment of a new central GEO will indeed address the current shortcomings of 
global environmental governance as it would allow for more unity between the various actors 
in global environmental law as well as actual conformity in relation to decisions that are 
made and mandates that are given. A GEO will provide the global community with a central 
point of departure for any environment-related matter, and this too allows for better 
coherence and understanding when dealing with matters of the environment as everyone 
would know ‘who to turn to’ when these matters arise. The global community must invest the 
time and resources to form a more effective, coherent and focused governance system in 
order to truly achieve our goals and build a better, sustainable future. This requires a strong 
environmental governance arm to enable a balanced integration of economic, social and 
environmental governance.183 Executive Director of the United Nations Environment 
Programme, Achim Steiner, said ‘without a strengthening of international environmental 
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governance, whatever is potentially agreed in Rio20 will only contribute to a persistence of 
the challenges, rather than the delivery of the opportunities and the imperative for a more 
intelligent and equitable 21st century development.’184 Since there are many environmental 
issues at hand that currently affect the international community as a whole, it is of paramount 
importance that the international community binds together in order to eradicate the problems 
which it faces in terms of the environment. If environmental degradation continues to occur 
at this rapid rate, soon there will be no sources of livelihood for the inhabitants of earth. Thus, 
it is very important that an international body is formed whose purpose is to solely deal with 
environmental matters. One body can indeed eliminate the factors which are currently faced 
now, as there will finally be unity amongst the international community with regards to the 
environment. There will be no fragmentation and dilution as a result. Factors of access and 
participation will also be eradicated as there will be one centralized body who deals with 
environmental concerns. It will be no small feat to produce a new consensus that will set a 
real path towards the future we need. If the world is serious about achieving these new goals, 
we will need a strong and coordinated governance institution with the resources and 
jurisdiction to facilitate and enforce compliance. We thus need to establish a new global 
environmental organisation in order to ensure that we as the global community can achieve 
better and effective global environmental governance in order to combat the scourge of 
environmental degradation as well as other environmental problems that exist globally 
today.185 
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